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ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF LOCAL TAXATION ON PROPERTY 
PRICES: A SPATIAL MATCHING CONTRIBUTION 
 
  
1. Introduction 
Issues surrounding the impact of local taxation and public services are the key concern in a 
wide literature based on Tiebout (1956) which shows that individuals reveal their preferences 
by ”voting with their feet.” If citizens are faced with choosing among several communities 
that offer different types or levels of public goods and services, then they will choose the 
community that best satisfies their own individual requirements. Citizens needed high levels 
of public goods will be concentrated in communities with high levels of public services and 
high taxes, while those with low level demand will tend to choose other communities with 
lower levels of public services and lower taxes. If households were perfectly mobile, Tiebout 
(1956) argues that an efficient pattern of local services would be attained without the 
intervention of a central government. However, Tiebout’s argument does not cope with 
property tax or capitalization. Later analyses combined the introduction of a property tax with 
Tiebout’s key assumptions (perfect mobility across jurisdictions, complete information, 
multiple jurisdictions). On the one hand, Oates (1969) and Brueckner (1979) argue that 
capitalization exists when lower property taxes or better local public services lead to higher 
house values. On the other hand, Edel and Sclar (1974), Hamilton (1975), and Epple, Zelenitz 
and Visscher (1978) focus on supply responses to rent differentials and predict the 
disappearance of this capitalization (see Yinger (1982) and Starret (1981) who discuss the 
validity of land capitalization).   
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Following Oates (1969, 1973), numerous empirical analyses have addressed capitalization of 
interjurisdictional fiscal differentials. From this large literature, Cushing (1984) was the first 
to consider that if capitalization of interjurisdictional fiscal differentials occurs, it should be 
most obvious at the border between two jurisdictions. He and others (Black, 1999; Gibbons 
and Machin, 2003, 2006; Kane, Riegg and Staiger, 2006; Fack and Grenet, 2010) use housing 
price differentials between adjacent blocks at the border of two jurisdictions to study 
capitalization. This ’geographical boundary’ approach has also been applied in models 
examining the effects of cross boundary differences in taxation on employment growth 
(Duranton, Gobillon and Overman, 2007).  
 
This paper is aimed at providing empirical evidence on the impact of local taxation on 
property prices, using the geographical boundary method and applying it to the French 
context. We focus on the local property tax that applies to buildings and is based on the 
property’s theoretical rental value. The impact of this tax rate on property prices has been the 
subject of numerous debates in France (Mercier, 2000) since the theoretical values estimated 
by the French administrations is often very different from the actual property values.1  
 
The main contribution of the paper is to apply a more rigorous spatial matching and 
differencing strategy to the taxation/expenditure question. We use data on individual housing 
which are available for two French urban areas (Dijon and Besançon) for about 10,000 house 
sales, for the period 1994 to 2004. Our empirical methodology pairs transactions to estimate 
the impact of property taxation on prices. After identifying transactions close to the 
jurisdiction borders, we can control for housing characteristics to isolate time-varying local 
property taxes. Spatial differencing and instrumental variables (IV) methods allow us to 
compare sales and to control for the endogeneity of local taxation. 
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Our results suggest that the local property tax rate does not have the expected impact on 
property price levels. However, when it is crossed with variables used to evaluate the base, it 
has a significant and negative effect when the base proxy is large. We can conclude that 
buyers are more sensitive to the amount of taxes they will have to pay than to the tax rate. 
This is logical, since in France local property bases vary substantively.  
   
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a short review of the literature on fiscal 
capitalization. Section III presents the data and summary statistics. The methodology is 
described in Section IV and the main results are contained in Section V. Section VI presents 
some robustness checks and section VII concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
We describe the theoretical background and the econometric issues associated with the 
estimation of hedonic models.  
2.1. Theoretical background 
We use the simple model of Yinger (1982) to introduce the capitalization of property rate into 
house value. Households are assumed to be similar. When choosing a residential location, we 
assume that a household considers the property tax rate, t,  and the level of local public 
services per household, G,  in each jurisdiction. The amount a household is willing to pay for 
one unit of housing services depends on the supply of public goods and the tax rate that apply 
to a jurisdiction. As a consequence, the bid function for one unit of housing is given by:  
( )P P G t= , .Assuming that a house contains H  units of housing services, the value of the 
house to the household may be given by: ( ) ( )V G t P G t H r, = , /  where r  is the discount rate.  
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Each household has to pay a property tax that is proportional to the value of the house, i.e. 
( )tP G t H r, / .The household’s income Y  is used to buy a composite consumption good X  
whose price is unitary, housing services in quantity H  at price P  and property taxes at rate 
t . The maximization problem for the household is as follows:  
 
max ( )
( ) [1 ]
Z H G t
U X H G
s t Y X P G t H t r
, , ,
, ,
. . = + , + /
 
 
To describe the effect of property tax on house values for a given level of public services G∗,  
we must solve the following equation given by one first-order condition:  
 
[1 ] ( ) ( ) ( ) 0Y P H PH t r P r t P P r t P
t t r t
′∂ ∂ ∂= + / + = + + = + + =
∂ ∂ ∂
 (1) 
 
with P′ =  Pt∂∂ .The solution for this differential equation (1) can be written as:  
 ( ) ( )P G t P H r t∗ ′, = / +  (2) 
 
Combining this solution into the equation for house value, we can derive the capitalization of 
property tax rate into house values for a given level of public services:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )V G t P G t H r P H r t∗ ∗ ′, = , / = / +  (3) 
 
If we let the level of public goods supply vary, equation (2) becomes: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )P G t rP G r t′, = / +  
where ( )P G′  describes each household’s bid for housing services before tax, i.e. for 0t = .   
 
To determine the form of ( )P G′ ,  we have to compute the housing demand H . We thus have 
to specify the utility function. Choosing a Cobb-Douglas utility function, we get:  
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( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )U X H G X H Gα β γ, , = + +
 
 
The household’s bid function is for every pair ( )G t, : 
 
( ) CrGP G t
r t
γ
β
, =
+
 
where C is a constant of integration. If we assume that housing services are a multiplicative 
function of housing characteristics, 1Z  to nZ , the value of a house becomes:  
 
1
( ) ( ) i
n
a
i
i
CrGV G t P G t H r Z
r t
γ
β
=
 
 , = , / =
 + 
∏  
or 
 
1
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
n
i i
i
V C G r t a Zγ
β =
= + − + +∑  (4) 
 
This relationship (4) describes how the value of a house capitalizes for a given discount rate 
r , public services G  weighted by their preferences γβ ,  property tax t  and the housing 
characteristics. Yinger’s definition of capitalization when households are assumed to be 
similar is thus the following. Local fiscal variables are completely capitalized into house 
values when the variation in house values within or between the jurisdictions exactly reflects 
what households are willing to pay for the different public goods-tax couplings in different 
locations.  
2.2. The empirical tests 
Let us turn now to the empirical estimation of the resulting model which is called the 
traditional hedonic specification: 
 
1
n
i i
i
V c G t a Z Nζ τ η ε
=
= + − + + +∑  
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where N  are neighborhood characteristics and ε  is a vector of i.i.d. error terms.  
 
There are numerous empirical analyses of capitalization of interjurisdictional fiscal 
differentials. Oates’s (1969, 1973) seminal papers found significant capitalization of public 
services and almost complete capitalization of property tax rate differentials for a sample of 
cities in the state of New Jersey. Follain and Malpezzi (1981), on the other hand, concluded 
that fiscal surplus, i.e. public service expenditures minus taxes per capita, differentials were 
not capitalized into house values. Other studies have produced diverse results (see e.g. Edel 
and Sclar, 1974; King, 1977; Rosen and Fullerton, 1977; Wales and Wiens, 1974; Sonstelie 
and Portney, 1980; Chaudry-Shah, 1989, etc.)  
 
An important consideration is how locational effects, positive as well as negative, are 
capitalized into house values. Can (1992) distinguishes between two levels of externalities. 
The first captures the neighborhood effects, i.e. the impact of common neighborhood 
characteristics on housing prices. The second level includes spatial spill-over effects - 
adjacency effects - such as the impact of the prices of neighboring structures. These effects 
are not confined to jurisdictions, they can cross boundaries. As argued by Can (1992), 
locational effects require the use of different specifications for the housing price equation (see 
details in the appendix A). We need to test for spatial effects to detect the existence of spatial 
dependence and/or spatial heterogeneity and to choose the right specification. 
  
To circumvent the problems associated with spatial effects, we use an alternative 
methodology, first implemented by Cushing (1984) and developed by Black (1999) to test the 
theoretical prediction that housing prices are influenced by the quality of schools.2 The main 
estimation problem is that measuring the effects of school quality on housing prices raises an 
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endogeneity problem since better schools tend to be located in wealthier neighborhoods 
because of the higher performance of children from more privileged families. Black (1999) 
suggested comparing the prices of houses located on opposite sides of a common elementary 
school district boundary. She assumes that changes in school quality are discrete at the 
boundaries, whereas changes in neighborhood characteristics are smooth. She goes on to 
relate the differences in mean prices of houses located at opposite sides of attendance district 
boundaries, to performance in school examinations. Then, houses differ only in terms of 
elementary schools. Her sample is based on a selection of the sales located within 0.15 mile of 
a boundary. She finds that parents are willing to pay 2.5% more in house prices for a 5% 
increase in test scores. In our paper, we will apply this geographical boundary approach to our 
taxation/expenditure issue. 
  
Gibbons and Machin (2003, 2006) also use this method to explain school choice. To do so, 
they build a hedonic property price model. It is well known that the difficulty of this approach 
is to specify what to include in the hedonic price function since neighborhood composition is 
endogenous in a property value model. To circumvent the problem of simultaneity between 
property prices and performance, they used instrumental variables (IV) method for school 
performance. They isolate schools characteristics - historically determined school-type 
characteristics - that influenced performance but were not affected by local property prices or 
neighborhood socio-economic status. They exploited the co-variation in house prices and 
school performance within narrowly defined spatial groups and computed spatially weighted 
means for the variables in their model at each observation, whereby the nearest observation 
receives the highest weight. They find that a percentage point increase in the neighborhood 
proportion of children reaching the government-specified target grade pushed up 
neighborhood property prices by 0.67%. Following Gibbons and Machin (2003, 2006), we 
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will use IV to circumvent the problem of simultaneity between property prices and taxation 
(or expenditure). In our case, this problem is due to the Tiebout sorting effect that implies that 
richer people have a preference for more public services.  
 
The paper by Fack and Grenet (2010) provides empirical evidence on the impact of middle 
school quality on housing prices in Paris, using data on both school zoning and real estate 
transactions over the period 1997-2003. Building on geographical boundary approach, they 
use a matching framework to compare sales across school attendance district boundaries and 
to deal with the endogeneity of school quality. They compare each transaction with a 
constructed counterfactual transaction. This fictive counterfactual sale is supposed to be a 
measure (all else being equal) of the amount involved in a reference sale if the property were 
located in another school zone. The price of the counterfactual transaction is computed as the 
weighted geometric mean of the prices of all transactions that took place in the same 
neighborhood but in a different school zone. Their estimates are similar to those found in US 
and UK studies (Black, 1999; Gibbons and Machin, 2003, 2006): a standard deviation 
increase in school quality raises prices by about 2%. 
  
As Fack and Grenet (2010), we will build some counterfactual sales to study the effect of 
taxation and expenditure on transactions. Their methodology is very useful for our question 
since we are interested in what happens on each size of a border, the municipal border. 
However, we will improve this methodology in the way we use density to build the 
counterfactual variables. This choice is explained in the methodology section.  
   
Although their study is of the impact of local taxation on employment growth and not the 
influence of school quality on housing prices, the methodology used by Duranton, Gobillon 
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and Overman (2007) is an improvement on previous methodologies in that it corrects for 
unobserved local effects, unobserved establishment heterogeneity and endogeneity of local 
taxation (rather than school quality). However, house transactions can not be considered as a 
panel data, except when each housing is sold many times and local public policy observed in 
the long run. Our data set does not fulfill these conditions. 
  
3. Data and summary statistics 
In this section, we present the data. Since data are transactions and therefore do not constitute 
panel data, the methodology used here is closer to that in Fack and Grenet (2010) than to the 
methodology employed by Duranton, Gobillon and Overman (2007).  
3.1. Housing prices 
Our data on property sales come from Perval, which was created by the Notary Chambers in 
France - all property sales are registered with Notary offices. For each transaction, we have 
information on the sale price of the property (see figure 1), along with details of features such 
as size, number of rooms, date of construction, etc. and precise geographical location. The 
geographical precision of geocoded data, i.e. Lambert grid coordinates, is about 10 meters. 
Our sample is restricted to house sales in two urban areas (Dijon and Besançon) between 1994 
and 2004, giving a sample of around 10,000 transactions. It should be noted that value added 
tax on real estate is payable by the seller for a property sold in the first 5 years after its 
construction. This is charged at the rate of 19.60% of the selling price. We include this tax as 
an explanatory variable. 
 
 [Figure 1 about here] 
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3.2. French local taxation 
France is usually considered as unitary in terms of government although different layers of 
local governments have wide fiscal autonomy. The structure of local government is broadly 
four tiered. The lowest tiers consist of 36,600 municipalities and 13,000 groups of 
municipalities. The third tier consists of 96 departments and the top tier is the 22 regions that 
are at the highest level of local government. Local revenue sources derive mainly from local 
taxes (54%), central government grants (23%) and borrowing (10%). Each level of local 
government sets its own tax rates, on a common tax base, for a large range of local direct 
taxes, which account for 75% of local tax revenues.  
 
Local authorities have considerable latitude in the tax rates for these four types of taxation.3 
The “local tax varying power” is the proportion of local resources represented by tax revenue, 
over which local authorities have some control; France has the second highest level of tax 
autonomy (54%) in the European Union, compared with 20% in Germany which is a federal 
country, and Spain (35%) which is close to being a federal country, and the UK at 14%. 
Furthermore, the degree of tax revenue decentralization computed as the ratio between 
subnational government own tax revenue over consolidated general government total tax 
revenue is equal to 18.4% in France over the period 1999-2001, while it on average 14% in 
the EU-15 over the same period (see Stegarescu (2000) using the OECD (1999) categories of 
tax autonomy). Vertical imbalance is the degree to which subnational governments rely on 
central government revenues to support their expenditure and is likely to increase the size of 
the public sector when the expenditure responsibilities of sub-national governments do not 
match their revenue raising power. This indicator - measured by intergovernmental transfers 
as a share of subnational expenditures - was of 34.9 per cent in France in 1972-2004 but was 
higher in the EU-15 at 43.7 per cent for the same period (Source: International Monetary 
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Fund). 
 
There are two local taxes that are based on theoretical rental value according to the local land 
registry. Property tax is payable by the owner, while housing tax is payable by the occupier. 
Property tax is made up of two different tax rates that apply respectively to the buildings and 
to the land belonging to the property. Tax rate is set within jurisdiction but as tax base is 
different for each property, the amount of taxes that owners or occupiers have to pay is 
different. 
  
New buildings and renovations are exempt from tax for two years. Taxes are also not 
applicable to buildings used for agricultural purposes or if the premises are used exclusively 
for farming, business or student lodgings. People aged over 75 and those with disability 
pensions are also exempt from property/housing tax and discounts are available for some 
people over 65 on low incomes.  
 
The local business tax (the so-called Taxe Professionnelle) is the major source of tax revenue 
for local governments since it accounts for approximately 45% of the revenue from direct 
local taxation. Its tax base is mainly capital goods and it is calculated on the rental value of 
the buildings and the equipment.  
 
There is an institutional rule in France that ties the increase in local business tax rates to the 
increase in household taxes (property and housing tax rates). A jurisdiction cannot set a higher 
(lower) tax rate for business if it has not increased (decreased) its housing tax rates. 
Consequently, the relationship between the local business tax rate and the housing tax rate is 
often complementary (Charlot and Paty, 2007). Although collected centrally these taxes are 
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distributed to local jurisdictions and are used to finance local public services, such as rubbish 
collection, street cleaning, schools and other community facilities, as well as the 
administration of these services.  
 
We focus on the property tax (PT) rate that applies to buildings and is based on the theoretical 
rental value of the property.4 The impact of this tax rate on property prices has been much 
debated in France (Mercier, 2000). Since the last major updating of property bases in 1970, 
theoretical property values often differ widely from actual values.  
As we are interested in local tax variations, where applicable, the municipal tax rate is added 
to the tax rates of the group of municipalities.5 Fiscal data are from the Direction Générale des 
Collectivités Locales (DGCL, Ministère de l’Intérieur). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Figure 2 shows that the evolution of property prices more or less matches the evolution of 
property tax rates. Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for each fiscal variable.  
  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Maps 1 and 2 show that property tax rate and mean property price are spatially correlated. 
Both increase with a decrease in the distance from the city center. This can be explained in 
various of ways. Both variables are strongly correlated to urban amenities and access to 
employment. The significant relationship between these variables therefore may have little to 
do with land capitalization but may be due to the location of the property. 
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[Map 1 and Map 2 about here] 
4. Methodology 
In order to estimate the impact of local taxation on property values, we estimate a ”spatial 
difference” model similar to that of Fack and Grenet (2010). Their methodology is adapted to 
take account of the variability in density of large urban areas. In a first step prices are 
estimated by a classical hedonic regression with individual characteristics only. Then the 
estimated price is transformed and regressed on municipal variables. The transformation is a 
spatial difference to control for the location specific effect, measuring all neighborhood 
effects including local amenities (distance to the city center, access to infrastructure,...) and 
spatial interactions between transactions. This methodology is aimed at comparing each 
individual transaction to any other transaction located close by, and therefore within the same 
neighborhood. Each transaction is matched with a counterfactual sale constructed with other 
very close transactions.  
   
This is a two-step estimation. In the first step, the house price is assumed to depend on its 
individual characteristics.  
 
   
(5) 
 
where iX  is the vector of property’s characteristics. This regression leads to an estimated 
price of the house that gives the mean price that the house would be sold taking into account 
its own characteristics.  
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(6) 
 
Once individual characteristics are controlled, we focus on the price of access to a specific 
neighborhood and to specific municipality facilities. The price of houses, located in 
neighborhood n , in municipality m  and sold at time t , is assumed to be a sum of a 
neighborhood fixed effect, a municipal fixed effect, a time fixed effect and an error term, 
n m tε , , :  
  
(7) 
 
The different fixed effects are assumed not to be correlated to each other and uncorrelated 
with the error term.  
 
If one transaction that takes place in one municipality, 1m , were to be transposed to another, 
2m , but within the same neighborhood, and the same year, the difference in the fixed effects 
combination would only be mΨ . If the time and the neighborhood fixed effects disappear mΨ  
can be identified. In order to do so, for each sale we compute a counterfactual sale, which 
evaluates the price of the house if it were sold at the same time and in the same neighborhood 
but in another municipality. Under these assumptions, we write:  
 
   
(8) 
 
Page 14 of 41
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
15 
 
The municipal fixed effect is assumed to be a linear function of the log of the local tax rate in 
the year of the transaction, mτ , municipal public spending per capita, mPS , and an error term, 
mδ :  
 ln lnm m m mPSγ ρ π τ δΨ = + + +   
(9) 
 
Municipal public spending is introduced to proxy for the quantity of public services provided 
locally. The composition of municipal public spending is as follows: street lighting, roads, 
water supply, kindergartens, ancillary activities for primary schools (canteens, extracurricular 
activities...). They vary hugely among municipalities: they are equal to 444,690 thousands 
Euros on average, with a standard error equals to 616,167.  
 
Introducing (9) in (7) leads to:  
 
 
 
 
  (10) 
 
where  is the estimated price of the counterfactual. The measurement error induced 
by the estimation of the counterfactual sale price only affects the dependent variable and 
hence will not bias the estimation of ρ  and π .  
In order to consider that the neighborhood remains the same, the counterfactual estimated 
price and municipal characteristics are the weighted mean of these variables of all the 
transactions occurring within a certain distance, and in the same year. For each variable iZ  
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characterizing the transaction i  (estimated price, tax rate and local public spending), we 
calculate the counterfactual variable using the following transformation:  
 
 
 
where j  are all the transactions that take place within the defined distance from transaction i  
occurring in the same year. i jd ,  is the euclidean distance between i  and j .  
 
We now describe the criterion used to decide which transactions j  are chosen to build the 
counterfactual variables and therefore to set the maximum distance under which the 
neighborhood can be considered as identical. Our data apply to large urban areas, including 
urban and suburban environments where the latter is less dense. In order to examine whether 
access to local amenities is more sensitive to distance in very dense contexts than in less 
dense ones, and in order not to give too much weight to urban transactions, we chose a 
maximum distance that depends on municipal population density, for each transaction. We 
therefore built our counterfactuals by considering all transactions within the distance 
threshold from i , d , defined by:  
 
min
(( ) 2)i j
dd
density mun density mun density city center
=
+ / /
 
 
where density  imun  and density  jmun  are the population density in the municipality where 
transaction i  and transaction j  take place. density  city  center , the density of the city 
center, is introduced in order to take account of the fact that our observations are localized in 
two different urban areas: Dijon and Besançon. mind  is introduced for transactions in the city 
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center, since otherwise d  would be equal to 1. We also set a maxd , for transactions that occur 
in less dense municipalities. The larger mind , the greater the weight given to the transactions 
occurring in the denser municipalities, i. e. close to the city center. Conversely, the larger 
maxd , the greater the weight given to less dense municipalities.  
Finally, all transactions j  from a distance smaller than d  of transactions i , occurring in the 
same year, are used to calculate the counterfactual characteristics. It allows controlling for 
constant spatial variables as well as time changes. 
5. Results 
To control for the impact of the distance threshold, we estimate the second step equation (10) 
for two different counterfactuals, depending on the maximum threshold distance; in the first 
case maxd  is equal to 1,000 and in the second case equal to 2,000 meters. In the second case 
there are more transactions in the suburbs in the data. In order not to give too much weight to 
the more centrally located transactions, the mind  is quite small and always the same: 200 
meters. The maps below show the transactions for which we were able to build a 
counterfactual, with max 2 000d = , .  
 
 
[Map 3 and Map 4 about here] 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
  
 
As we want to focus on fiscal land capitalization, and since owners do not pay the housing tax 
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if they do not occupy the accommodation, we only estimate the impact of property tax on 
transactions price. Summary statistics on property tax rates are presented in Table 2. The 
average property tax rate depends on the urban area and the distance threshold. Higher 
average values are observed for Dijon and when no distance threshold is applied. When more 
transactions in the suburbs are introduced, the average property tax rate takes a lower value, 
about 13.4% with a standard deviation of 4.4. In our view, we have sufficient variation to 
perform our estimations for both thresholds.  
In the first step we estimate the classical hedonic regression, in order to control for house 
characteristics:  
 1 2 3 4 5 6ln i m t i i i i i i m tp S Room GS Tconst VAT Tα β β β β β β ε, , , ,= + + + + + + +  (11) 
 
where i m tp , ,  is the price per square meter of the housing good i , observed in the municipality 
m
 at period t . iS  is the living space of the housing good and iGS  is the size of the garden 
weighted by the living space, which takes the value zero when there is no garden. iRoom  is 
the number of rooms weighted by the living space. iTconst  is a set of dummies defining the 
date when i  was built; 1Tconst  takes the value 1 when the property was built before 1850, 
2Tconst  when it was built between 1850 and 1913, 3Tconst  between 1914 and 1947, 
4Tconst  between 1948 and 1969, 5Tconst  between 1970 and 1980, 6Tconst  between 1981 
and 1991. 7Tconst  takes the value 1 when the property was built after 1992 and was not new 
at the time of the transaction, 8Tconst  takes the value 1 when the property was built after 
1992 and was new when the transaction occurred. iVAT  is the value added tax on real estate. 
The value added tax rate is different for houses of different ages: for new one it is zero, for 
home built within the last 5 years it is a small (5.09%) and older homes are levied at the full 
rate (19.6%). It is therefore to introduce it as a control variable. We also introduced a trend 
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variable ( )iT  in order to control for the global evolution of the housing market. Table 3 shows 
the results for the first step regression. 
  
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
We first see (column 1) that the size of the property tax has a negative impact on the sale price 
(per square meter) and no impact when the distance threshold is extended to 2,000 meters. 
The room number weighted by the property size has a positive coefficient suggesting that this 
characteristic increases the sale price. We obtained significant coefficients for the date of 
construction showing that older properties are less expensive than more recently built ones. 
Finally, the real estate value added tax has a negative impact on lodging prices.  
   
In the second step we estimate the equation (10), relating spatial differences in estimated price 
to spatial differences in municipal public policy variables:  
 
 
 (12) 
 
Results of equation (10) estimated by OLS are given in Table 46.  
  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
First, local public policy, in terms of property tax rate and operating public spending, does not 
explain any variance (or very little) in the price per square meter in our French data. The 
coefficient associated with local public spending per capita is never significant. Even when 
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controlling for the operating public spending, the property tax rate has no or a barely 
significant effect on property prices, once the effects of the local environment are controlled 
for using the spatial differences methodology. When transactions used in estimates are less 
concentrated in the denser areas, the elasticity of property price to the tax rate is almost 5%. 
Moreover, this coefficient is only significant at 10%. These results, which are very similar 
when the maximum distance is equal to 1,500 meters, suggest that neither property tax nor 
operating public spending have effect on property prices.  
 
6. Robustness checks 
6.1. Tax base effects 
Since in France, the property tax base may be disconnected from the price of the transaction, 
the amount of tax paid by owners of two houses with the same characteristics and costing the 
same can vary. We try to proxy for this tax base in order to control for its effect on the 
transaction price. We do not have data that include the base of the property tax which is 
different for each transaction and is correlated to the characteristics of the house and also with 
its age; the tax base of old buildings has not been reassessed since 1970. With the same 
features (size…), the tax base of an older house therefore is smaller than the tax base of a new 
one. Thus the tax value paid by the owner is also smaller. The house buyer is more sensitive 
to the tax she or he will have to pay than to the tax rate. 
The value of newly constructed homes is assessed accurately during the year of construction. 
However, these values are not subsequently updated. The value of recent constructions is 
closer to the actual value than the values assigned to older ones. In order to take this effect 
into account we introduce a variable interacting size, time of construction and tax rate rather 
than tax rate alone. 
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In the second step, the equation becomes the following:  
 
 
 
 
 (13) 
 
Recall that i mPS ,  is the amount of public spending by the municipality m  where i  is 
localized. m tτ ,  is the local (municipal plus jurisdictional) local tax rate observed in the year of 
the transaction.  
i i i m tS Tconst τ , ,× ×  is introduced to proxy for the amount of real taxes paid by the owners of 
each house. This is the tax rate multiplied by a proxy for the base related to each house. This 
base is not available from our data, but it clearly depends on the size of the house and its 
period of construction. We present the estimated results of equation (13) in Table 5 for maxd  
equals to 1,000 in the first column and to 2,000 in column 2.  
  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Recall that 1Tconst  takes the value 1 when the property was built before 1850, 2Tconst  
when it was built between 1850 and 1913, 3Tconst  between 1914 and 1947, 4Tconst  
between 1948 and 1969, 5Tconst  between 1970 and 1980, 6Tconst  between 1981 and 1991. 
7Tconst  takes the value 1 when the property was built after 1992 and is not new when the 
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transaction occurs, 8Tconst  takes the value 1 when was built after 1992 and is new when the 
transaction occurs. 5Tconst  is the reference.  
 
Almost all the time dummies are significant and show that, all else being equal, the older the 
house, the more the tax rate weighted by size has a negative impact on the transaction price. 
This is true for houses built before 1991, just before the last updating of property bases. This 
result confirms that, in France, property tax matters for house prices, but it is necessary to take 
into account the fact that fiscal bases vary among transactions build at different period to 
observe the negative relationship.  
6.2. Endogeneity 
As described in the introduction, the Tiebout sorting effect implies that richer people have a 
preference for more public services, and leads to the fact that property prices and local public 
policies can be simultaneously determined. This means that property tax rate and the 
operating public spending may be endogenous; they also depend on local wealth and therefore 
on property prices. We test for potential endogeneity in both local variables. When local 
property taxation and/or public spending are endogenous, the IV method is used, as in Tables 
6 and 7.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
In Table 6, column (1) where public operating spending and the tax rate are both considered 
to be exogenous, this exogeneity is not rejected. In column (2), exogeneity is rejected only for 
operating spending. Detailed results of instrumental regressions, exogeneity tests and the 
weakness of instruments are available on request. The first step adjusted R 2 , the F test of 
instruments equals zero and the p. value of the exogeneity test are presented in appendix B, 
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table 8. It is instrumented by the housing tax rate,7 and the national government grant 
(”Dotation Globale de Fonctionnement”).8 and the local public capital expenditures. When 
regressing the instruments on the residual, they are all rejected at 10%.  
 
While the level of property tax rates influences the level of property prices, the housing tax 
rate does not. This outcome may be explained by the fact that owners do not pay the housing 
tax if they do not occupy the accommodation. In France, around half of the population rents 
its accommodation. Moreover, housing tax payment depends on the revenue of the occupier. 
Many categories of housing tax payers benefit from total tax exemptions or partial tax 
reductions. These reductions are strongly related to revenue and individual characteristics e.g. 
being elderly (aged over 60 years), having a handicap/disability, being a widow or widower, 
etc. Overall, more than one in two households (about 10 million households) benefits from a 
partial or total exemption.  
 
Since local officials simultaneously consider both tax rates when setting rates, housing tax 
rates is a good instrument for property tax rates: the housing tax rate is correlated to the 
property tax rates (correlation coefficient is about 83%, depending on data set) but not with 
property prices. 
 
There are a number of national government grants in France. We used as instrument the basic 
grant (“dotation de base”), which depends on the size of the local population.9 This is 
computed as a lump sum grant for each inhabitant in the locality. This grant is therefore 
correlated to property tax rates, not to property prices. 
 
Capital expenditures are exogenous to house prices, although operating expenditures are not. 
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Operating expenditure accounts for some 60-80 per cent of overall municipal spending; 
capital expenditures can be financed from loans but operating spending cannot. Operating 
expenditure therefore depends directly on local revenues but capital expenditure does not.  
 
The capital expenditures are also exogenous to house prices, even if operating expenditures 
are not. These operating spending accounts for about 60 to 80 per cent of overall municipal 
spending (see Foucault, Madies and Paty, 2008) and the capital expenditures can be financed 
by loan since operating spending can not. The operating expenditures therefore depend 
directly from local revenues when the capital ones do not. There are two other kinds of 
explanations for why municipal capital expenditure and housing prices in the same year are 
not statistically related.  
The first is linked to the time lag between capital expenditure and its effect on the quantity 
and quality of local public services. There can be a large disconnect between construction 
period and putting into use. For example, construction of a tramway line incurs huge cost 
before the line comes into service, with the result that in the period of investment in this 
transport infrastructure housing prices are not correlated to capital expenditure in the same 
period. If the new tramway line is capitalized in house pric s, this cannot be observed in one 
year, and the timing of major public capital spending is not the same as the timing or date 
when housing prices optimally capitalize the new public service. Capital expenditure unlike 
other public investment, does not have a one-shot effect.  
The second reason is that a large part of local capital expenditure is financed by other levels 
of government, especially inter-municipality and regional levels. It should be noted that since 
the beginning of the 1990s, there has been constant introduction of laws reviving local 
cooperation in France. Based on the volunteering principle, neighbouring municipalities that 
desire to collectively finance and manage some public services can create an inter-
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municipality. This supra-municipal structure then co-exists with the municipal structure. 
Municipalities have transferred to inter-municipalities much of their expenditure in a bid to 
promote substantial economies of scale, including road building and maintenance, wastewater 
system, water supply...  95% of French municipalities belong to an inter-municipality and this 
applies to both areas studied in this paper: Besançon and Dijon. For example, capital 
expenditure for the inter-municipality of “Grand Dijon” was about 60 million euros in 2010, 
whereas capital expenditures for the city of Dijon was 80 millions euros. Finally, regional 
government is a big investor. For example, investment spending for the region of 
“Bourgogne” (which includes Dijon) was about 400 million euros (for the whole region). 
 
In Table 7, column (1), exogeneity is rejected only for the tax rate (p. value=0.0038). The first 
step adjusted R 2 , the F test of instruments equals zero and the p. value of the exogeneity test 
are presented in appendix B, table 9. For some interaction terms exogeneity cannot be 
rejected, but all variables are considered endogenous for coherence. They are instrumented by 
the housing tax, the housing tax rate multiplied by the size and the period of the building, and 
the national government grant. When regressing the instruments on the residual, they are all 
rejected at 10%. 
  
In column (2), exogeneity is once again rejected (p.value=0.103) only for the property tax 
rate. For some interaction terms exogeneity cannot be rejected, but all variables are, once 
again, considered to be endogenous. They are instrumented by the housing tax, the housing 
tax rate multiplied by the size and the building period and the capital spending. When 
regressing the instruments on the residual, they are all rejected at 10%.  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
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Let us first comment on the result associated with the local public spending, which is that it 
has a significant positive effect on house prices. This result seems to confirm the assumption 
that local public services may be positively capitalized in property prices, especially in less 
densely populated areas. We can see that the distance threshold affects this result.  
   
The property tax rate alone never has a significant impact on the property prices (per square 
meter). When the maximum threshold is equal to 1,000 meters, only four periods of 
construction time, size and tax rate have a significant effect. These effects are coherent with 
the assumption that the amount of taxation is more important than the rate; the older the house 
is, the lower the impact of the tax rate multiplied by the size on the prices. This effect is larger 
for houses built between the two World Wars. Column 2 also shows that property tax rates 
seem not to have a significant impact on property prices, when considered alone. However, 
almost all interaction terms are significant; the newer and larger the house, the more the tax 
rate increases the house price. We can conclude that the house price capitalizes the local 
taxation, but the amount of taxes paid by the owner has a greater impact on their choice of 
house than the tax rate.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to provide empirical evidence on the impact of local taxation on 
property prices, controlling for the amount of local public spending, in two French urban 
areas: Dijon and Besançon, using data on property taxation and real estate transactions for the 
period 1994-2004. We used an empirical methodology that allowed us to compare sales in the 
same spatial environment and to control for endogeneity in local taxation and public 
spending. We found first that local public spending has almost no effect or a very small effect, 
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on property prices. We also found that local property taxation does not have the expected 
negative impact on transaction prices. However, buyers are more sensitive to the amount of 
taxes they will have to pay than to the tax rate.  
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Appendix A: Econometric issues related to estimation of the hedonic model  
 
Considering capitalization into house values, Can (1992) distinguishes between two levels of 
externalities. The first captures the neighborhood effects, i.e. the impact of common 
neighborhood characteristics on housing prices. The second includes spatial spill-over effects 
- adjacency effects- such as the impact of prices of neighboring buildings on the price of a 
given property. These effects are not confined to jurisdictions, they can cross boundaries. As 
argued by Can (1992), locational effects require the use of different specifications for the 
housing price equation. The first includes neighborhood effects as direct determinants of 
house values. The resulting model is called the traditional hedonic specification: 
 1
n
i i iV c G t a Z Nζ τ η ε== + − + + +  
where N  are neighborhood characteristics and ε  is a vector of i.i.d. error terms.  
The second specification incorporates spatial heterogeneity. Neighborhoods are no longer 
treated as direct determinants of housing prices but as determinants of spatial drift in the 
structural parameters. This model is called the spatial expansion specification:  
 1 1( )ni iO k iV c G t a a N Zζ τ ε== + − + + +  
 
The next two specifications include both neighborhood effects and adjacence effects.  
The traditional hedonic autoresgressive specification is as follows:  
 1
n
i i iV c WV G t a Z Nρ ζ τ η ε== + + − + + +  
where WV  is the spatially lagged dependent variable and ρ  its parameter. Finally the last 
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model, the inclusion of the autoregressive term leads to the spatial expansion autoregressive 
specification:  
 1 1( )ni iO k iV c WV G t a a N Zρ ζ τ ε== + + − + + +  
 
Spatial effects are present in three out of four of these model specifications. In the spatial 
expansion specification, spatial heterogeneity is introduced in the form of varying-parameters. 
In the traditional hedonic autoregressive model, spatial dependence is included using the 
autoregressive form. Both spatial heterogeneity and dependence are incorporated in the final 
specification. Tests for spatial effects need to be run to detect the existence of spatial 
dependence and/or spatial heterogeneity and to choose the right specification.  
 
 
Appendix B: Results on the validity and the weakness of instruments   
As suggested by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995), we consider that the partial R 2  and the 
Fisher test of instruments equals zero at the first-stage of IV regressions are good indicators of 
the quality of instruments. The following tables present them for IV estimates we have 
considered in section 6.  
 
[Table 8 here] 
  
  
[Table 9 here] 
Page 31 of 41
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
32 
 
 
 
                                                 
1The last major updating was in 1970. 
2Holmes (1999) also used the discontinuity border effect to test the impact of US state policies on local 
development. 
3
 Municipal tax rates are voted on annually on the basis of predicted annual spending and the tax base. 
French local governments have great autonomy in their tax rate decisions and divide necessary 
expenditure by the tax base to get the tax rate.  
4The property tax base is half of the property’s theoretical rental value; the housing tax base is the 
whole value. 
5Groups of localities (or EPCI) are not formal local governance structure since they are not 
compulsory and they do not apply to the whole territory. Localities can decide not to join these groups. 
However, where they exist, they have autonomy for setting tax rates using the same tax base as the 
other three levels (localities, counties and regions). 
6Property tax rates and local public spending are not colinear. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 
equal to 0.39, when Dist.max=2,000, and it is equal to 0.59, when Dist.max=1,000. 
7The housing tax is also based on property rental value and payable by the occupier. 
8Local revenue sources also come from central government grants (23%). 
9
 However, it appears that the grant attribution criteria are very complicated (see Dupoirier et al. 
2006). They are also based on multiple indicators such as geographical aspects (size, length of 
roads…), social features (average income, number of social houses..) and many others that may be 
positively or negatively linked to house prices. Because of this complexity, Dupoirier et al. show that 
there is there is wriggle room for public decision making in grant awards and that grants are correlated 
more to political features (political proximity to the national government). 
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Tables and figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Property prices per square meter 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Property tax rate (%) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Property tax rate (%) 
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Variable  N Mean Std DevMinimumMaximum
Property tax (%)  13577 16.049 5.817 1.000 34.770 
Prop. Prices (Euros psm)  13577 873.172566.217 0.213 4380.15 
Living space (sm)  10362 94.106 44.856 8.000 602.000 
GardenSize  10362 5.733 13.789 0.000 588.086 
Rooms number  10362 4.242 1.806 0.000 17.000 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
 
 
 
Map 1: Property prices (square meter) in the urban areas of Dijon and Besançon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2: Property tax rates in the urban areas of Dijon and Besançon 
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Map 3: Transaction location in the urban area of Dijon (dmax=2,000 m)  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Map 4: Transaction location in the urban area of Besancon (dmax=2,000 m)  
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Table 2: Average (standard deviation) property tax rate in %  
 
 Distance threshold 
Urban area  200/1000 200/2000 None 
Number of municipalities  80 226 361 
Dijon  16.45 (5.20) 13.98 (4.75) 17.36 (5.76) 
Besançon  12.24 (2.70) 12.41 (3.55) 16.15 (5.64) 
Total  15.36 (5.03) 13.44 (4.44) 16.90 (5.74) 
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Table 3: Results of the hedonic model estimates   
 
 (1) (2) Dist. max=1,000 (3) Dist. max=2,000  
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS 
Size  -0.00048***  (-5.86)  -0.00185**  (-5.00)  -0.00017  (-0.89)  
Number of rooms  5.800***  (20.36)  3.855**  (2.79)  8.902**  (11.95)  
Garden size  0.000251  (0.96)  0.0019**  (3.77)  0.00068  (1.67)   
Timeconst1  -0.1507***  (-11.72)  -0.349**  (-4.77)  -0.3401**  (-10.74)  
Timeconst2  -0.1746***  (-14.92)  -0.368**  (-6.34)  -0.2817**  (-10.43)  
Timeconst3  -0.1032***  (-7.80)  -0.328**  (-4.99)  -0.2896**  (-7.20)  
Timeconst4  -0.0352***  (-3.65)  -0.0953*  (-2.78)  -0.0500*  (-2.23)  
Timeconst6  0.0997***  (9.68)  -0.0299  (-0.92)  0.0591**  (3.01)   
Timeconst7  0.1824***  (11.81)  0.0474  (0.83)  0.0898**  (2.70)   
Timeconst8  0.2078***  (8.42)  0.0747  (0.71)  0.1014  (1.50)   
VAT  -0.0067***  (-6.46)  -0.0049  (-1.39)  -0.0049*  (-2.23)  
1995  -0.0320  (-1.58)  -0.158*  (-2.96)  -0.0459  (-1.16)  
1996  -0.0162  (-0.87)  -0.086  (-1.94)  -0.0048  (-0.14)  
1997  -0.0342*  (-1.95)  -0.0587  (-1.18)  -0.0417  (-1.30)  
1998  0.0116  (0.72)  -0.1455**  (-3.15)  0.0089  (0.32)   
1999  -0.0444***  (-3.98)  -0.0966*  (-2.36)  -0.0795**  (-3.47)  
2001  0.0675***  (6.01)  0.0131  (0.33)  0.0412  (1.68)   
2002  0.0952***  (7.90)  0.0238  (0.46)  0.0708*  (2.38)   
2003  0.1647***  (14.29)  0.1422*  (2.46)  0.183**  (6.80)   
2004  0.3799***  (22.54)  0.2815  (1.33)  0.384**  (3.64)   
Intercept  6.710***  (6.71)  7.122**  (72.68)  6.573**  (126.67)  
Adj. R 2   0.2050  0.2156  0.2490   
Number of obs.  10,053  629  2,164   
 
Dependent variable: Observed sale price per square meter. ** : significant at 1%, * : significant at 5%. T-values in 
parentheses.  
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Table 4: Results of the second step estimates in spatial differences with OLS 
 
Variables  (1) Dist. max=1,000  (2) Dist. max=2,000  
Estimation method  OLS  OLS   
Property tax rate  -0.00273  (-0.05)  -0.05437**  (-2.06)   
Local Public Spending  -0.01053  (-0.70)  0.00473  (0.63)   
Adj. R 2   0.000  0.0011   
Number of obs.  585  2082   
  
Dependent variable: spatial difference of estimated sale price per square meter. *** : significant at 1%, ** : significant at 5%. 
, *: significant at 10%.T-values in parentheses.  
 
Table 5: Results of the second step estimates in spatial differences with base proxy and 
OLS 
 
Variables  (1) Dist. max=1,000  (2) Dist. max=2,000   
Estimation method  OLS  OLS   
Property tax rate  0.0454  (0.81)  0.01532  (0.60)   
Local Public Spending  -0.0057  (-0.38)  0.01354*  (1.84)   
Timeconst1*Size*tax rate  0.000008  (0.29)  -0.0000152***  (-9.97)  
Timeconst2*Size*tax rate  -0.00009***  (-4.13)  -0.0000096***  (-9.74)  
Timeconst3*Size*tax rate  -0.00008***  (-2.92)  -0.0000150***  (-5.02)  
Timeconst4*Size*tax rate  -0.00002**  (-2.24)  -0.0000074***  (-4.45)  
Timeconst6*Size*tax rate  0.00004***  (2.83)  0.0000074***  (3.68)   
Timeconst7*Size*tax rate  0.00001  (0.49)  -0.000010  (-1.29)  
Timeconst8*Size*tax rate  0.00006  (1.04)  0.0000258***  (2.62)   
Adj. R 2   0.0700  0.1079   
Number of obs.  585  2082   
  
Dependent variable: spatial difference of estimated sale price per square meter. *** : significant at 1%, ** : significant at 5%. 
, *: significant at 10%.T-values in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Results of the second step estimates in spatial differences using the IV method 
 
Variables  (1) Dist. max=1,000  (2) Dist. max=2,000   
Estimation method  OLS IV 
Property tax rate  -0.00273 (-0.05) -0.0042 (-0.45) 
Local Public Spending  -0.01053 (-0.70) -0.0420 (-1.53) 
Adj. R 2   0.000 0.0010 
Sargan p. value  0.2648  0.8292  
Number of obs.  585 2082 
 
Dependent variable: spatial difference of estimated sale price per square meter. *** : significant at 1%, ** : significant at 5%.  
*: significant at 10%.T-values in parentheses.  
 
Table 7: Results of the second step estimates in spatial differences using the IV method 
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Variables  (1) Dist. max=1,000  (2) Dist. max=2,000   
Estimation method  IV  IV   
Property tax rate  -0.10379  (-1.39)  -0.05133  (-1.43)   
Local Public Spending  0.017898  (1.06)  0.02204***  (2.82)   
Timeconst1*Size*tax rate  0.000034  (1.19)  -0.00012***  (-10.14)  
Timeconst2*Size*tax rate  -0.00008**  (-3.67)  -0.00010***  (-10.20)  
Timeconst3*Size*tax rate  -0.00008***  (-3.05)  -0.00008***  (-5.34)   
Timeconst4*Size*tax rate  -0.00002**  (-2.46)  -0.00003***  (-4.70)   
Timeconst6*Size*tax rate  0.000035**  (2.29)  0.000026***  (3.48)   
Timeconst7*Size*tax rate  0.0000006  (0.27)  -0.000010  (-1.45)   
Timeconst8*Size*tax rate  0.000038  (1.29)  0.000075***  (2.86)   
Adj. R 2   0.073  0.1207   
Sargan p. value  0.3627   0.4419   
Number of obs.  585  2082   
 
Dependent variable: spatial difference of estimated sale price per square meter. *** : significant at 1%, ** : significant at 5%.  
*: significant at 10%.T-values in parentheses.  
Table 8: Results of the first step estimates without tax base control 
 
Endogenous variables  (2)Dist. max=2,000*   
 Part. Ad. R 2   F. value  Exo. test   
Local Public Spending  0.611  1092  0.1173   
 
 Instruments: housing tax rate, national government grant (”Dotation Globale de Fonctionnement”) and local public capital 
expenditures.  
Table 9: Results of the first step estimates with tax base control  
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Endog. variables (1) Dist. max=1,000 (2) Dist. max=2,000 
Part. Ad. R 2  F. value Exo. test Part. Ad. R 2  F. value Exo. test 
Property tax rate 0.62172 107 0.0066 0.52393 255 0.0461 
Tconst1*Size*tax r. 0.99315 9390 0 0.98264 13086 0.0002 
Tconst2*Size*tax r. 0.99414 10991 0.4146 0.97756 10070 0 
Tconst3*Size*tax r. 0.99400 10727 0.1592 0.99025 23481 0 
Tconst4*Size*tax r. 0.99772 28322 0.2988 0.99137 26545 0.0228 
Tconst6*Size*tax r. 0.98983 6306 0.5986 0.98809 19182 0.2311 
Tconst7*Size*tax r. 0.99267 8769 0.2905 0.98738 18087 0.6686 
Tconst8*Size*tax r. 0.99424 11184 0.2905 0.97559 9236 0.5244 
Number of obs. 585 2082 
 
Instruments: housing tax rate, housing tax rate multiplied by the size and the building period, and national government grant 
for (1) and local public capital expenditures for (2).  
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